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SYMPOSIUM
Justice Blackmun and Judicial
Biography: A Conversation with Linda
Greenhouse
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE
“WORLD OUT THERE”: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SYMPOSIUM *
Heidi Kitrosser †
This issue and the symposium on which it is based were
inspired by Linda Greenhouse’s wonderful and much-praised
book, 1 Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s
Supreme Court Journey. 2 Greenhouse, the New York Times’
Pulitzer Prize-winning Supreme Court reporter, 3 was one of
two journalists 4 granted early access to a treasure trove of
personal and official papers left to the Library of Congress by
the late Justice Harry Blackmun. 5 Her book is based on
Blackmun’s papers. 6

*
This title is based on the title of Harold Hongju Koh’s 1994 tribute to
Justice Blackmun: Justice Blackmun and the “World Out There,” which itself borrowed
a phrase from a dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun. For full citation information
see infra note 9.
†
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1
For reviews of the book, see, for example, David J. Garrow, The Accidental
Jurist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 27, 2005, at 36; Laura Kalman, “Becoming Justice
Blackmun”: Deconstructing Harry, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, § 7, at 9; Bob
Minzesheimer, “Becoming Justice Blackmun” Follows an Ideological Journey, USA
TODAY, May 9, 2005, at 4D; Jeffrey Rosen, A Pivotal Justice Less Than Supremely
Confident, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2005, at E43.
2
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005).
3
See Kalman, supra note 1.
4
The other journalist was Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio. See
Garrow, supra note 1, at 37.
5
Id.; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Unveiling Justice Blackmun, 72 BROOK. L.
REV. 9, 11-16 (2006).
6
Garrow, supra note 1, at 37.
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Justice Blackmun was both widely revered and widely
criticized for emphasizing the real world ramifications of Court
decisions and for acknowledging his own struggles in resolving
some cases. 7 It is fitting that a Justice so known for tying
constitutional decision-making to its human geneses and
consequences would leave to the public so extensive a record of
the Justices’ decision-making processes and of his own
experiences during his years on the Court. 8
Becoming Justice Blackmun—the literary fruit of Linda
Greenhouse’s access to this archive—very much reflects the
connection that Justice Blackmun perceived between
constitutional decision-making and the “world out there.” 9
Greenhouse elegantly weaves biographic stories with details of
the Justices’ deliberations on cases and with doctrinal
background on the areas of case law cited. For example, in
discussing Roe v. Wade 10 —the case for which Justice
Blackmun, its author, is most famous—Greenhouse explains
the doctrinal line of which Roe became a part and subsequent
developments in the case law, 11 the significance of Justice
Blackmun’s past role as a lawyer for the medical profession, 12
and the personal and jurisprudential impact of public reactions
to Roe on Justice Blackmun. 13
Becoming Justice Blackmun, the Blackmun papers, and
Justice Blackmun’s life itself raise three important lines of
inquiry. First, they raise descriptive questions about the
relationship between jurisprudence and judicial biography.
That is, how do judges’ experiences impact their jurisprudence?
Second, they raise normative questions as to how much the
public should know about the human story behind judicial
decision-making. As historian Laura Kalman notes, “Some
justices destroy their papers. They believe the less the public
knows about the Supreme Court, the more easily the illusion is
7
See, e.g., GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 114, 207-11, 222-24, 231-32;
Garrow, supra note 1, at 41; Kalman, supra note 1; Rosen, supra note 1.
8
For discussion of the unprecedented breadth and depth of the Blackmun
papers, see, for example, Kalman, supra note 1; Koh, supra note 5, at 11-16.
9
See Harold Hongju Koh, Justice Blackmun and the “World Out There,” 104
YALE L.J. 23, 25 (1994) (“Blackmun came to see ‘another world “out there,”’ that the
Court ‘either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize.’” (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
10
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11
GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 73-80, 86-88, 98-101, 110-12, 133-34, 13845, 149-52, 182-206.
12
Id. at 74, 82-83, 90-92, 99.
13
Id. at 134-39, 206.
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preserved that our system is based on rule of law, rather than
men and women.” 14
Third, they raise normative questions about the impact
that judges’ understandings of the “world out there” 15 should
have on jurisprudence, particularly on constitutional
jurisprudence. Some argue that social and cultural change
should have no bearing on constitutional interpretation. 16
Justice Scalia, for example, famously argues that judges should
adhere to the “original meaning” of the Constitution’s text, by
which he means each provision’s original expected
For instance, in discussing the Eighth
application. 17
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, Justice Scalia argues that the death penalty
cannot legitimately be deemed “cruel and unusual,” regardless
of that term’s evolving social meaning or of changing
knowledge about the penalty’s application. This is because the
Constitution explicitly assumes the existence of the death
penalty in provisions such as the protection against deprivation
of life without due process of law. 18 Others counter, however,
that the content of the Constitution’s sweeping clauses are
designed to evolve with social and cultural change. 19 For
example, Ronald Dworkin argues:
[K]ey constitutional provisions, as a matter of their original
meaning, set out abstract principles rather than concrete or dated
rules . . . . [T]he application of these abstract principles to particular
cases . . . [thus] must be continually reviewed, not in an attempt to
find substitutes for what the Constitution says, but out of respect for
what it says. 20

With respect to the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment,
Dworkin argues:
The framers of the Eighth Amendment laid down a principle
forbidding whatever punishments are cruel and unusual. They did
14

Kalman, supra note 1.
See supra note 9.
16
See Jill Hasday, Conscription, Combat, and Constitutional Change Outside
the Courts (draft article, on file with author) (citing prevalence of this view).
17
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 37-41, 45-46 (1997); see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in id. at 115, 119
(referring to “‘expectation’ originalism, which holds that these clauses should be
understood to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to
have”).
18
SCALIA, supra note 17, at 46.
19
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 17, at 119-27.
20
Id. at 122.
15
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not themselves expect or intend that [the] principle would abolish
the death penalty, so they provided that death could be inflicted only
after due process. But it does not follow that the abstract principle
they stated does not, contrary to their own expectation, forbid capital
punishment. 21

Each article in this issue tackles one or more of these
important questions. That is, each paper grapples with one or
more of the following: the descriptive relationship between
jurisprudence and judicial biography, the extent to which the
public should be privy to this relationship, and the relationship
between constitutional decision-making and the “world out
there.” 22
Dean Harold Koh’s article straddles all three questions.
Dean Koh considers how to strike “the right balance between
disclosure and nondisclosure” of Supreme Court deliberations, 23
and situates the history of the Blackmun papers and their
release within this analysis. 24 Drawing upon the papers and
upon Linda Greenhouse’s book, he goes on to discuss aspects of
Justice Blackmun’s life history, including Justice Blackmun’s
evolving view of the relationship between government and
individuals and parallel changes in his constitutional
jurisprudence. 25
Professors Earl Maltz, Nan Hunter and Dena Davis
each focus on the descriptive relationship between
jurisprudence and judicial biography. Professor Maltz explains
that “[e]ach [Justice’s interpretive] position reflects a unique
set of influences and experiences. Judicial biographies provide
detailed accounts of these influences and experiences, thereby
deepening our knowledge of the forces that ultimately shape
Supreme Court jurisprudence.” 26 Professor Maltz discusses the
interplay of biography and jurisprudence through the example
of Justice Peter V. Daniel. 27
Professor Hunter reminds us of the importance of both
recognizing the personal histories that color Justices’
jurisprudence, and not overstating the influence of particular
biographical factors. Professor Hunter focuses on Justice
21

Id. at 120-21.
See supra note 9.
23
Koh, supra note 5, at 10.
24
Id. at 10-12, 19-23.
25
Id. at 24-34.
26
Earl M. Maltz, Biography is Destiny: The Case of Justice Peter V. Daniel,
72 BROOK. L. REV. 199, 199 (2006).
27
Id. at 200-09.
22
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Blackmun’s background as a lawyer for the Mayo Clinic and as
an admirer of the medical profession. 28 She argues:
[T]he longstanding “Mayo made him do it” explanation of Roe is
wrong and should be jettisoned. . . . Blackmun’s experiences as
counsel for Mayo left him more pragmatic than starry-eyed about
medical authority . . . . His papers indicate that he was concerned
about what he feared might be careless treatment of physicians’
interests, but he was not blind to medical parochialism nor engaged
in a mission to expand the authority of doctors. 29

Professor Hunter elaborates on the respects in which Justice
Blackmun’s background did and did not impact his views in
Roe v. Wade and other abortion cases. 30
Professor
Davis
discusses
Justice
Blackmun’s
involvement with his church and its relationship to his
Focusing on two sermons that Justice
jurisprudence. 31
Blackmun delivered to his church, Professor Davis identifies
multiple themes of compassion. 32 Similarly, says Professor
Davis,
much
of
Justice
Blackmun’s
constitutional
jurisprudence was grounded in compassion as a guiding
Professor Davis cites Justice Blackmun’s
principle. 33
acknowledgment of the uncertainty of much constitutional
interpretation, coupled with his observation that “‘we will
grope, we will struggle, and our compassion may be our only
guide and comfort.’” 34
The articles by Professors Jason Mazzone, Chai
Feldblum and Andrew Koppelman move the discussion from
the interaction between judicial biography and jurisprudence to
the interpretation of particular constitutional provisions. This
raises the “relationship between constitutional decision-making
and the ‘world out there.’” 35
Professor Mazzone considers Justice Blackmun’s view of
36
Professor Mazzone concludes that Justice Blackmun
juries.
28

Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical
Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147 (2006).
29
Id. at 149-50.
30
Id. at 162-66, 170-78, 192-93.
31
Dena S. Davis, Moral Ambition: The Sermons of Harry A. Blackmun, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 211 (2006).
32
Id. at 216-30.
33
Id. at 229-34.
34
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting ALAN STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND
MORALITY 262 (1984)), quoted in Davis, supra note 31, at 234.
35
See supra text accompanying note 22.
36
Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (2006).
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largely rejected conventional views of juries as “accurate fact
finders, guardians of liberty, and a source of legitimacy.” 37
Instead, Justice Blackmun valued juries as democratic bodies
in which citizens have the “opportunity . . . to participate in the
workings of government.” 38 This view manifests itself in
Justice Blackmun’s opinions upholding—and dissenting from
refusals to uphold—challenges to juror exclusions based on
race and gender. 39 From Justice Blackmun’s democracy-based
perspective, it was crucial “to ensure at least that juries were
open to all citizens.” 40 Justice Blackmun’s approach to juries
reflects his view of constitutional interpretation as an effort to
inform constitutional principles with insights from the real
world, including evolving social and cultural norms. In this
sense, Justice Blackmun’s approach to juries, as interpreted by
Professor Mazzone, parallels Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of
the Eighth Amendment. As with the Eighth Amendment and
capital punishment, the framers of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments surely did not expect the right to a jury trial or
the concept of equal protection to encompass the right of
women to sit on juries. “But it does not follow that the abstract
principle[s] they stated do[] not, contrary to their own
expectation, forbid” gender-based exclusions. 41
Professor Feldblum addresses the tension between the
right to act in accordance with one’s core belief system, a
concept that Professor Feldblum calls “belief liberty,” 42 and the
statutory equality rights of gays and lesbians. She considers
how judges should handle belief liberty claims brought by those
who wish not to comply with equal rights laws. 43 Professor
Feldblum would balance the interests at stake on a case-bycase basis. 44 The bulk of her article explains the grounding of
her balancing test, and the importance of grounding any caseby-case balancing, in a real world understanding of the
magnitude of interests on both sides of the scale. With respect
37

Id. at 47.
Id.
39
Id. at 48-55.
40
Id. at 38.
41
See Dworkin, supra note 17, at 121.
42
Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72
BROOK. L. REV. 61 (2006). Feldblum would protect belief liberty under the due process
clauses. See id. at 63. She would include within the scope of protection those beliefs
that “form a core aspect of the individual.” Id. at 83.
43
Id. at 115-22.
44
Id.
38
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to belief liberty, for example, she argues that judges often
“downplay the burden on religious people” forced to
Professor Feldblum, a
accommodate gays and lesbians. 45
former law clerk to Justice Blackmun who came out to him as a
lesbian, also ties her analysis to her understanding of Justice
Blackmun’s evolving views on gays and lesbians. 46
In response, Professor Koppelman’s article 47 critiques
Professor Feldblum’s article on two main grounds. First, he
would limit the constitutional protection of belief liberty to the
First Amendment’s protection of religious free exercise.
Professor Feldblum’s concept of belief liberty, he says, would
“create a presumptive right to disobey any law you dislike
Second, he argues that Professor Feldblum
intensely.” 48
underestimates the burden on conservative Christians who
wish to avoid equal protection laws when she conducts case-bycase balancing toward the end of her article. 49 He concludes
that courts typically should allow religious exemptions from
antidiscrimination statutes to stand (or should impose such
exemptions themselves under the First Amendment), 50 while
barring on equal protection grounds only those laws that
“reflect[] a bare desire to harm an unpopular group.” 51
Professor Koppelman’s approach takes evolving public
standards into account in a very direct way. His approach
would leave breathing room for community standards to evolve
at their own pace, while maintaining some minimum equalitybased protection for gays and lesbians. Koppelman concludes,
in short, that courts “can’t hurry love”—or tolerance—through
constitutional interpretation. 52
In Becoming Justice Blackmun, Linda Greenhouse
writes that the waters of Justice Blackmun’s life “carried him
to places he had never expected to go. And once having arrived
at the destination, he stepped onto dry land and performed in
ways that neither he nor others would have predicted.” 53 This
45

Id. at 110.
See id. at 65-69.
47
Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125
(2006).
48
Id. at 126.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 131-37.
51
Id. at 141.
52
See id. at 142.
53
GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 250.
46
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is a fitting metaphor not only for Justice Blackmun’s life, but
for the view of the Constitution arguably implicit in his
jurisprudence and championed by Ronald Dworkin among
others. Under this view, the Constitution outlines broad
principles and aspirations that gain content through the
lessons and developments of time. 54 The “world out there” does
not write the Constitution, but it informs it deeply. In
analyzing constitutional doctrine, the articles in this
symposium issue shed light on the application and desirability
of this interpretive approach. In analyzing the connection
between jurisprudence and judicial biography, the articles
connect doctrine to experience at a personal level. Such
emphasis on the relationship between the Constitution and
lived experience befits Justice Blackmun, a man who, according
to his successor Justice Stephen Breyer, managed to find in his
“cloistered [Supreme Court] office . . . not a narrowing, but a
broadening of mind, of outlook, and of spirit.” 55

54
55

See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 249-50.

